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NOTE
FREEDOM OF ATTENTION FOR TRANSIT RIDERS
Early in 1949 the patrons of public transportation in several large
American cities found themselves lurching forward to the accompani-
ment of soft FM radio music liberally interspersed with short com-
mercial announcements.1 Reactions among the passengers were varied.
Many felt that the music had "a soothing relaxing effect," 2 but others
were vociferous in disapproval, and feared that the cacophony of music
and audible advertisements was "a dark plot against sanity."3 Transit
Radio, Incorporated, the Cincinnati firm which pioneered the idea,
felt that it had launched a highly promising commercial venture, and
as one periodical put it, "If the newly formed Transit Radio, Inc.,
has its way, straphangers all over the nation will soon be bouncing
along to the strains of the 'Missouri Waltz' and 'Pepsi-Cola Hits the
Spot'."4
Transit Radio's hope for business success was predicated on a
scheme whereby it could guarantee to a group of advertisers the ear of
an audience which would have no choice but to listen. In the usual
arrangement, it would install radio receivers in the vehicles of a public
transit firm and agree to pay a fixed fee plus a percentage of the receipts
from advertisers for an exclusive broadcast franchise. Then it would
make an agreement with a local FM radio station to conduct programs
of music, news, and advertising designed especially for the commuter.
Since the receivers in these busses and streetcars were tuned to the one
station and could not be turned off or controlled from the vehicles, the
transit riders became a captive audience in the sense that they must
either listen or get off.5
'Business Week, Feb. 5, 1949, p. 64, col. 3 (Radios for Busses).
2News Week, Nov. 7, 1949, P. 54, col. 2 (The Sound and the Fury). These words
were reported as being spoken by a witness at a hearing held by the Washington, D.
C. Public Utilities Commission in an attempt to determine whether transit broadcast-
ing was consistent with "public convenience, comfort and safety." This hearing is
discussed at a later point in this comment. See infra p. 49.
'News Week, Nov. 7, 1949, P. 54, col. 2 (The Sound and the Fury).
4Business Week, Feb. 14, 1948, p. 38, col. 2, 3, P. 40, col. 3 (Transit Lines Woo
Riders and Dollars).
'Such a project presented a delightful prospect for the advertiser, for the
transit company, and for Transit Radio, but to elements of the riding public and
to some members of the press the outlook was disturbing. The New Yorker com-
mented that "An audience in captivity is a new stunt in this republic, although it
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Finally, as was to be expected, the critics of transit broadcasting
determined to seek legal protection from this assault on their attention.
The natural resort was to attempt to fit the new and unfamiliar situa-
tion into the scope of existing legal remedies. This treatment suggested
three possible attacks.6 First, from the tort aspect, transit radio could
conceivably be termed a nuisance. Second, with public transportation
already closely regulated by legislatively created administrative bodies,
relief might be had by application to a local public service commission.
Third, in a broader sense the captive listener might successfully charge
that transit broadcasting was a violation of the constitutional guaran-
tees of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The common law nuisance argument: Those desiring to put an end
to transit broadcasting could not rely on the law of private nuisance
because it applies only to an interference with a right in real property,7
and no such offense had been committed against the captive listener.
Public nuisance, however, has been broadly defined as "an act or omis-
sion which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public
in exercise of rights common to all."8 It includes interferences with the
public peace by loud and disturbing noises.9 The late Justice Cardozo
remarked that "The organs of smell and hearing, assailed by sounds
and odors too pungent to be borne, have been ever favored of the law," 10
and in the same opinion he pointed out that the test for nuisance by
sound was the "effect of the offensive practice upon the reasonable man
or woman of average sensibilities."" It is apparent that transit broad-
casting could logically be attacked as a noise disturbing to the public
peace, but a question remains as to whether under the Cardozo test
is old stuff elsewhere. Hitler captured his audience and found it quite useful while
it lasted. The Soviet leaders have their audience nailed down fast and are currently
finding it useful." New Yorker, Dec. 1o, 1949, p. 29, col. 2 (Notes and Comments). The
widely circulated Readers' Digest deplored: "This is almost an hour a day that
thousands of students count upon for study, and millions of other folks use for
reading or for quiet and relaxation. It is their time, but it no longer is theirs to use
as they wish. It has been stolen from them and-sold for commercial profit." Harvey,
Must We All Join The Captive Audience?, Readers' Digest, July, 1951, pp. 20, 2 1.
GThese approaches were suggested and analyzed by at least two legal writers. See
Shipley, Some Constitutional Aspects of Transit Radio (1950) 11 Fed. Com. B. J. i5o;
Note (1951) 51 Col. L. Rev. io8.
7Restatement, Torts (1989) c. 40, Intro. Note.
'Prosser, Torts (941) 566.
'Town of Davis v. Davis, 40 W. Va. 464, 21 S. E. 9o6, 909 (i895); People v. Ruben-
feld, 254 N. Y. 245, 172 N. E. 485, 486 (1930).
'"People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N. Y. 245, 172 N. E. 485, 486 (193o).
'People V. Rubenfeld 254 N. Y. 245, 172 N. E. 485, 487 (1930).
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the broadcasting would be declared to be offensive to the sensibilities
of the reasonable man. Even if this uncertainty were to be determined
in favor of an aggrieved listener, he would still have to show special
damages distinct from those sustained in common with the general
public before he Would be allowed to maintain an action at law for
damages12 or to seek equitable relief by injunction 13 from the public
nuisance. Furthermore, mental distress would likely be the damage
alleged and, inasmuch as a majority of courts have refused to allow
recovery upon such ground without attendant physical consequences,
14
tort redress does not appear feasible. Accordingly, it became necessary
for the transit riders to consider the other remedies that had been sug-
gested.
Attack through the regulatory commission: Public service commis-
sions in most of the states have been given control over the services
rendered by street railway companies, 15 with power to prescribe stand-
ards "for safety, speed, regularity, and general regulation of trans-
portation companies." 1 If transit radio could be shown to be an undue
hindrance to the proper operation of a public transit system, a public
service commission would order a cessation of the broadcasting. More-
over, the regulatory commission provided a remedy that was more easily
""Tort liability for public nuisance seems to have originated in 1536, when it
was first held that the action would lie if the plaintiff could show that he had suffered
special damage over and above the ordinary damage caused to the public at large by
the nuisance. This qualification has persisted, and it is uniformly held that a private
individual has no action for the invasion of the purely public right, unless his damage
is in some way to be distinguished from that sustained by other members of the
general public. Redress of the wrong to the community must be left to its appointed
representatives. The best reason that has been given for the rule is that it relieves the
defendant of the multiplicity of actions which might follow if everyone were free to
sue for the common harm." Prosser, Torts (1941) 569, 570.
'3McClintock, Equity (2d ed. 1948) §165.
"See note (1951) 51 Col. L. Rev. io8, 113; Prosser, Torts (1941) §11.
15Mosher and Crawford, Public Utility Regulation (1933) 173.
"Mosher and Crawford, Public Utility Regulation (1933) 173. Many states have
modeled their laws establishing utility commissions along the lines of the Wisconsin
and New York statutes. Therefore the sections of those statutes pertinent to control
over rapid transit are set out here. The Wisconsin statute provides: "Whenever the
commission shall find any existing rate, fare, charge, or classification, or any joint
rate, or any regulation or practice affecting the transportation of persons or property,
or any service in connection therewith is unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory
or any service is inadequate it shall determine and by order fix a reasonable rate, fare,
charge, classification, joint rate, regulation, practice or service to be imposed, observed
and followed in the future, in lieu of that found to be unreasonable or unjustly
discriminatory or inadequate." Wis. Stat. (1947) 195.05 (1). The New York law as to
street railroads provides: "Every corporation, person or common carrier . . . shall
furnish . . . such service and facilities as shall be safe and adequate and in all
respects just and reasonable." New York Public Service Law (1945) §26.
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available than that provided by the law of nuisance approach. There-
fore, the first attack on transit broadcasting was instituted in 'the
District of Columbia Public Utilities Commission against the Capital
Transit Company of Washington, D. C., in October of 1949.17 The hear-
ing was limited to the single determination as to whether radio receivers
in streetcars and busses were "consistent with public convenience,
comfort, and safety."'18 The Commission concluded that the broad-
casting in no way constituted a violation of the provisions of the Act re-
quiring adequate service; in fact, the Commission decided that service
was made better by the entertainment provided the riding public.19
Thus, the attack through the regulatory commission failed.
The constitutional argument: The objecting passengers at the
Washington hearing had maintained that the use of radio receivers
deprived the riders of freedom to listen or not to listen in violation of
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that it
also encroached upon their liberty and deprived them of their prop-
erty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
However, the Commission ignored these arguments as being irrelevant
to the issue of whether the broadcasts impaired public safety or com-
fort.20 After the final administrative order was entered dismissing this
investigation, an appeal was prosecuted to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia,21 but the court thought that "there
is no legal right of the petitioners that has been invaded, threatened or
violated," 22 and consequently the petition was dismissed. Appeal was
then taken to the United States Court of Appeals.
"Re Capital Transit Company, 81 P. U. R. ( N. S.) 122 (195o). Although the
Commission on its own motion issued the order instituting the investigation some-
what earlier, the formal hearings were not begun until October, 1949.
"Re Captial Transit Company, 81 P. U. R. ( N. S.) 122, 123 (195o).
"DRe Capital Transit Company, 81 P. U. R. (N. S.) 122, 126 (1950).
"Re Capital Transit Company, 81 P. U. R. (N. S.) 122, 123, 124 (195o).
""Any public utility or any other person or corporation affected by any final
order or decision of the Commission, other than an order fixing or determining the
value of the property of a public utility in a proceeding solely for that purpose,
may . . ." appeal to the District Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia, and "Any party, including said Commission, may appeal from the order
or decree of said court to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia .. .". D. C. Code (1940) §43-705. Under this section Franklin S. Pollak and
Guy Martin, who had been allowed to intervene in the hearing held before the
Commission, prosecuted an appeal as "persons affected." It was held in United
States v. Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia, 151 F. (2d) 6og (App.
D. C. 1945) that the term "person affected" includes a consumer of a public utilitl
company.
"As quoted in Washington Post, June 2, 1951, p. i, col. i. There is no report
available.
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Recently in Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission23 the Court of
Appeals unanimously held in favor of the appellant transit riders. The
holding was based entirely on the deprivation of liberty argument
which was found to be so compelling that the court did not deem it
necessary to discuss the abridgement of speech24 or the deprivation of
property25 arguments. Judge Edgerton declared: "In our opinion
Transit's broadcasts deprive objecting passengers of liberty without
due process of law. Service that violates constitutional rights is not
reasonable service. It follows that the Commission erred as a matter
of law in finding that Transit's broadcasts are not inconsistent with
public convenience, in failing to find that they are unreasonable, and
failing to stop them."
26
Since the Pollak case is a case of first impression recognizing an im-
portant new constitutional right of freedom from forced listening or
freedom of attention, it becomes extremely important that close
scrutiny be given to the reasoning which led to the conclusion reached.
The court started with the well established principle that the
constitutional guarantees of liberty are directed only against govern-
mental action.27 Here the court found governmental action involved in
the sense that Congress granted a franchise to the transit company by
which, for all practical purposes, it became a monopoly, thereby mak-
ing it necessary for the members of the public who depended on the
=19i F. (2d) 450 (C. A. D. C. 1951). The Supreme Court granted a petition for
review on writ of certiorari on October 15, 1951.
2 4Since the Supreme Court had recognized the right to receive a protected
communication in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143, 63 S. Ct. 862, 863, 87 L. ed.
1313, 1316 (1943), it was argued that this "right appears to include the negative
freedom not to receive the communication." Note (1951) 51 Col. L. Rev. io8, 116. The
analogy was drawn to McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 2o3, 68 S. Ct. 461,
92 L. ed. 649 (1948) wherein the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion was
held to include freedom not to have a religion.
5,, . . . If the attention of the transit riders is of commercial value to the FM
station and its advertisers, it would seem to be another class of intangible property
having sufficient value to the individual- to come within the protection of the Con-
stitution." Shipley, Some Constitutional Aspects of Transit Radio (ig5o) ii Fed. Com.
B. J. 15o, 16o.
-6Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, 191 F. (2d)
450, 458 (C.A.D.C. 1951). It should be noticed that the court held that the commission
erred as a matter of law. In determination of an appeal from an order or decision
of the commission, the review is limited to questions of law. D. C. Code (1940)
§43-706.
2"The Fifth Amendment 'is a limitation only upon the powers of the General
Government,'... and is not directed against the action of individuals." Corrigan v.
Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 330, 46 S. Ct. 521, 523, 70 L. ed. 969, 972 (1926). The Four-
teenth has "reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action of private
individuals." Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318, 25 L. ed. 667, 669 (1880).
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company for transportation to ride in the vehicles in which the offend-
ing sounds were present. Hence, the forced listening resulted from
governmental action. The court cited no authority, but its proposition
can be substantiated by analogy to Shelley v. Kraemer2s where state
action was found in the judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant
between private parties. In the transit radio situation it can be said
that the congressionally sanctioned monopoly enabled the privately
operated transit firm to recruit a captive audience, "supported," as
the Shelley case said, "by the full panoply of state power."29 Further-
more, the court pointed out that the utilities commission, an agency of
government, sanctioned the broadcast when its negative order dismissed
the investigation and allowed the forced listening to continue. 30
Once it had been found that there was governmental action in-
volved in the transit radio scheme, the next step was to decide if any
constitutional right had been violated by this action. There was no
direct authority to cover the assault by decibel on a captive group,
but there were a number of cases which had vaguely intimated that the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments might be
broad enough to include a freedom of attention. As early as 1897 in All-
geyer v. Louisiana the United States Supreme Court clearly recognized
that the "liberty" mentioned in the Due Process Clauses is "deemed
to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all
his faculties .... ."31 Shortly thereafter, Brannon reiterated this prin-
ciple and cited copious case authority to show that the word liberty
was a generic term embracing "almost all the essential rights of the
person."32 In 1928 Justice Brandeis, speaking in a dissent in Olmstead
28334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. ed. 1161 (1948). See Note (1949) 6 Wash. and
Lee L. Rev. 192.
2Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 19, 68 S. Ct. 836, 845, 92 L. ed. 1161, 1183
(1948). The power used in the Pollak case was that of the federal government and
therefore the court was called on to enforce the safeguards of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
"OThe court quoted the Supreme Court to the effect that "An order . . .dis-
missing a complaint on the merits and maintaining the status quo is an exercise of
administrative function, no more and no less, than an order directing some change
in status." Rochester Telephone Corporation v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 142, 59
S. Ct. 754, 763, 83 L. ed. 1147, 1159 (1939). Justice Frankfurter gives an extensive
discussion of so-called negative orders.
51165 U. S. 578, 589, 17 S. Ct. 427, 431, 41 L. ed. 832, 835 (1897). Although this was
the first case in which clear recognition was given to such a definition of liberty,
it was not the first case to indicate that liberty might be so broadly construed. See
Justice Bradley's concurring opinion in Butchers' Union Slaughter House v. Crescent
City Live-Stock Landing Company, 111 U. S. 746, 760, 762, 4 S. Ct. 652, 656, 657, 28 L.
ed. 585, 588, 589 (1884).
"Brannon, A Treatise on the Rights and Privileges Guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (goi) 115.
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v. United States, insisted that the makers of the Constitution "sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men."
83
In a dissent in Martin v. Struthers, a case which struck down an
ordinance forbiding house-to-house canvassing as a violation of freedom
of speech and press, Justice Reed was insistent in asserting that "The
First Amendment does not compel a pedestrian to pause on the street
to listen to the argument supporting another's views of religion or
politics. Once the door is opened, the visitor may not insert a foot and
insist on a hearing." 34
More recently Justice Frankfurter in a dissent in Saia v. New York, 35
in which Justices Reed and Burton concurred, gave concrete form to
this concept of freedom of attention. So pertinent was the language
that it might have been designed and phrased to cover the transit raido
situation:
"The native power of human speech can interfere little with
the self-protection of those who do not wish to listen. They may
easily move beyond earshot, just as those who do not choose to
read need not have their attention bludgeoned by undersired
reading matter. And so utterances by speech or pen can neither
he forbidden nor licensed, save in the familiar classes of ex-
ceptional situations .... But modern devices for amplifying the
range and volume of the voice, or its recording, afford easy, too
easy, opportunities for aural aggression. If uncontrolled, the re-
sult is intrusion into cherished privacy. The refreshment of
mere silence, or meditation, or quiet conversation, may be dis-
turbed or precluded by noise beyond one's personal control."36
The latest pronouncement from the Court on the right of freedom
of attention was made in Kovacs v. Cooper,3 7 a decision which upheld
a municipal ordinance prohibiting the operation from vehicles upon
city streets of sound amplifiers which emitted "loud and raucous" noises.
Justice Reed; a staunch proponent of freedom of attention, spoke for
three justices:
"The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may
be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take
3277 U. S. 438, 471, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 570, 572, L. ed. 944, 953, 956 (1928).
"319 U. S. 141, 154, 157, 63 S. Ct. 862, 869, 870, 87 L. ed. 1313, 1323, 1324 (1943).
'344 U. S. 558, 562, 68 S. Ct. 1148, 1151, 92 L. ed. 1574, 1578 (1948).
"Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558, 562, 563, 68 S. Ct. 1148, 1151, 92 L. ed. 1574, 1578,
1579 (1948).
7336 U. S. 77, 69 S. Ct. 448, 93 L. ed. 513 (1949).
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it. In his home or on the street he is practically helpless to escape
this interference with his privacy by loud speakers except
through the protection of the municipality.
'38
The Kovacs case completed the progression of statements that en-
abled the Court of Appeals in the Pollak case to give, for the first time,
an express recognition to freedom of attention as a constitutionally
protected right. The court adopted the Allgeyer proposition that the
"liberty" included in the Due Process Clause encompasses the right
to free enjoyment of faculties, concluding that one who is forced to
listen is not free to use his faculties. Then it turned to the Kovacs case
and reasoned that the upholding of the ordinance against "loud
and raucous" sound amplifiers mounted on trucks meant that the public
interest in freedom of attention was so important that it out-weighed
the public interest in broadcasting a communication protected under
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.3 9 By analogy it follows
that public interest in freedom of attention outweighs a private com-
mercial interest in transit broadcasting which is not protected 4O by the
First Amendment.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Court of Appeals limited itself
solely to the commercial aspect of transit radio, the reasoning of the de-
cision would be equally valid in a situation where only occasional
broadcasts of music were made. It would seem that if a passenger has
the right to be free from the harrassment of the commercially operated
program, he would also have the right to a totally silent radio. How-
ever, freedom of attention is not absolute. Urban life necessitates the
suffering of some noise, and a passenger of modern rapid transit can-
"Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 86, 69 S. Ct. 448, 453, 93 L. ed. 513, 522 (1949).
See Note (1949) 6 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 74 for discussion of the voting line-up of
the Justices in this case.
OPollak v. Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, 191 F. (2d)
45o at 457 (C. A. D. C. 195).
"Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52, 62 S. Ct. 920, 86 L. ed. 1262 (1942). This
case held that public streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of
communicating information, and that while states may regulate such communica-
tions they may not unduly burden its employment in thoroughfares, but there is no
such restraint placed on the states in regard to commercial advertising. Packer Cor-
poration v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105, 52 S. Ct. 273, 76 L. ed. 643 (1932) indicates that
advertising of the sort involved in transit broadcasting could be regulated or even
prohibited, if necessary to protect the public. In that case street car placards and
billboards were classified separately from other advertising media because "In the
case of newspapers and magazines, there must be some seeking by the one who is
to see and read the advertisement. The radio can be turned off, but not so the bill-
board or street car placard." 285 U. S. io5, 110, 52 S. Ct. 273, 275, 76 L. ed. 643, 647
(1932).
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not complain that those noises which are the ordinary incidents of
such travel infringe upon his freedom of attention. Some discomforts
may perhaps be inevitable, but the forced listening to a radio even if it




"See Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, 191 F.
(2d) 450, 457 (C. A. D. C. 1951).
[Vol. IX
